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Between 1837 and 1852, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roger 
B. Taney was severely divided over the scope of national authority to 
regulate interstate commerce. Although the Taney Court decided only one 
case that directly involved the question of slavery and interstate commerce 
(Groves v. Slaughter}, the purpose of this paper is to explore the Court's 
treatment of interstate commerce during this period and the influence of the 
growing slavery controversy on that treatment. The potential nationalizing 
power of the commerce clause--power that could restrict, prevent, or 
promote the interstate slave trade and transform slavery into a national, 
constitutional issue--was an important factor in the Taney Court's disjointed, 
divided treatment of interstate commerce during this period, when the issue 
of national authority was rendered politically dangerous by the slavery 
controversy. National uniformity through the congressional commerce 
power had the potential to both restrict and expand the "peculiar institution." 
The commerce clause may have been the most effective constitutional 
instrument the Court had for allocating power between the states and the 
nation.1 Three essential questions that arose over interstate commerce and 
slavery were: (1} Was federal authority exclusive? (2} Did commerce 
include transportation of persons? (3} Were slaves persons or property? 
The first two questions emerged in the Marshall-era commerce clause 
cases. The philosophy of commercial nationalism was victorious, if cau-
tious, during these years, but new conditions, political and physical, were to 
bring this nationalism into question in the years ahead. 
The latent power of national authority over interstate commerce was 
recognized and expressed by Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. 
Ogden (1824} and accorded an even greater scope of national exclusivity 
1 R. Kent Newmyer, The Supreme Court under Marshall and Taney (Arlington Heights: 
Harlan Davidson, 1968), 101. 
42 Fairmount Folio 
in Brown v. Maryland (1828). In Gibbons, Marshall avoided the question of 
congressional exclusivity over commerce by pointing to existing federal 
legislation (the Coastal License Act) that conflicted with a state-granted 
monopoly. In the opinion, however, Marshall implied that the "commerce 
power might have been sufficient to void the state act even without an actual 
conflict." Marshall also defined commerce as "every species of commercial 
intercoarse [sic]," thereby potentially extending commerce beyond the mere 
exchange of goods. Four years later, in Brown, involving state licensing of 
importers of out-of-state goods, Marshall voided the state license tax in the 
absence of concurrent federal legislation, stating that "the commerce power 
was foreclosed to the states just because it had been given to Congress."2 
Looming in the background of Gibbons, however, was a case that sprang 
from the Denmark Vesey slave revolt conspiracy of 1817. Following the 
Vesey incident, South Carolina passed an act that, among other things, 
required the incarceration of free black seamen arriving in port from another 
state or foreign nation. This act also required the ship's master to pay the 
cost of incarceration. In Elkison v. Deliesseline (1823), decided in federal 
circuit court in South Carolina, Justice William Johnson declared the Nego 
Seamen's Act an unconstitutional interference with the commerce clause 
and the federal treaty-making powers. Johnson's opinion was published as 
a pamphlet and in the Nationallntelligencer, causing a states' rights back-
lash. As a result, Johnson became a "pariah in his home state" of South 
Carolina. Marshall discussed the violent reaction to Johnson's opinion with 
Justice Story in correspondence dated September 26, 1823. Marshall, 
despite his broad interpretation of the commerce power in Gibbons and 
Brown, had "avoided the constitutional issue (The Brig Wilson v. United 
States, 1820)" involving a similar Virginia law, by excluding passengers and 
crew from his definition of commerce. According to Marshall, "a crew 
member does not fall within its [the commerce clause] terms." Regarding 
the potential controversy that would be engendered by confronting the trans-
portation of persons with the commerce clause, Marshall wrote Story that 
he was "not fond of butting against a wall in sport ."3 This statement stands 
as an early example of the Court being politicized by the issue of slavery. 
2Marshall quoted in Newmyer, Marsha/land Taney, 50-52. 
3Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the Courtroom: An Annotated Bibliography of Cases 
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1985), 257; Irwin Rhodes, ed., The Papers of 
John Marshall: A Descriptive Calendar, vol. 2 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1969), 218, 179; quoted in R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 205. 
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The political conflict that surrounded cases such as those prompted by 
the Negro Seamen's Act produced a certain caution in even the most 
nationalistic Marshall Court commerce clause decisions. As noted above, 
Marshall avoided pronouncing outright federal exclusivity in Gibbons and 
avoided making broad pronouncements in Brown. In Wilson v. Black Bird 
Creek Marsh Co. (1829), Marshall stepped back from the Brown decision 
and allowed for concurrent state regulations in certain instances. 
Between 1829 and 1837, President Andrew Jackson appointed seven 
new justices: John McClean (1829); Henry Baldwin (1830); James Wayne 
(1835); John Catron and John McKinley (both 1837); and Roger Taney as 
Chief Justice after John Marshall's death in 1835. President Jackson's 
democratic, states' rights, anti-national bank philosophy was in its 
ascendancy. John C. Calhoun had anonymously published the South 
Carolina Exposition and Protest in 1828, and 1832 saw the Nullification 
Crisis come to a climax. There was, as well, a renewal of the antislavery 
movement; publication of William Lloyd Garrison's The Liberator began in 
January, 1831, and the American Anti-Slavery Society was established in 
1833. In this new atmosphere a delicate interpretation of the commerce 
power was needed, one which would please both North and South and, at 
the same time, would encourage national commerce.4 
The first commerce clause case decided by the Court under Chief 
Justice Taney was New York v. Miln (1837). The case involved a New York 
law requiring ships' captains, upon arrival in a New York harbor, to supply 
personal information on all incoming passengers and pay the cost of caring 
for those sick and indigent. The question before the Court was whether this 
law involved a regulation of foreign and interstate commerce by the state of 
New York. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Philip Barbour, took 
a radical states' rights position that avoided the commerce clause question. 
According to the Court, the New York law was intended as a polite measure 
to control the influx of indigent and otherwise undesirable persons into New 
York. Going deeply into the realm of states' rights, Barbour asserted that "a 
state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons 
and things within its territorial limits as any foreign nation where that 
jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the Constitution of the United 
States." A state's police power was seen by Barbour as "unlimited."5 
According to constitutional historian Martin Siegel, "Philip Barbour moved in 
4Newmyer, Marshall and Taney, 102. 
5New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 662. 
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the Virginia orbits of Judge Spencer Roane and ... John Taylor." Barbour 
further possessed an "almost obsessive states rights doctrine" and was 
"able to align himself with conservative Eastern slave holders.!!{j 
The two remaining justices from the Marshall Court, Joseph Story and 
Smith Thompson, felt obliged to take up the commerce clause question. 
Justice Thompson's concurring opinion suggested that states had a concur-
rent power "until Congress asserts the exercise of the power." Justice Story 
dissented from the majority and upheld the old Marshallian exclusivity of 
national commerce powers. Story held that "if the regulation of passenger 
ships be in truth a regulation of commerce ... the act in controversy is ... 
an act which assumes to regulate trade and commerce."7 The question of 
the status of passengers under the definition of "commerce" was, however, 
to remain open. Furthermore, Justice Barbour's "undeniable and unlimited 
jurisdiction" opinion created a controversy of its own in later cases. 
The three essential questions--Was the power of Congress to regulate 
commerce exclusive? Did commerce include the movement of persons? 
Were slaves persons or property?--are all found in Groves v. Slaughter 
( 1841 ). This case involved nonpayment of debt for slaves and the validity 
of the contract for payment. The conflict arose from Section 2d of the 
Mississippi Constitution, which read as follows: "The introduction of slaves 
into this state, as merchandise, or for sale, shall be prohibited from and after 
the first day of May, 1833."8 The attorney for Slaughter, Mr. Gilpin, argued 
that the amendment required enabling legislation, legislation that was never 
enacted. Therefore, the amendment had no force; the contract was legiti-
mate, and Slaughter was entitled to payment. 
Supporting Slaughter were Henry Clay and Daniel Webster. Clay argued 
that the regulation of commerce implied preservation and not annihilation; 
to prohibit the introduction of slaves as merchandise was to interfere with 
the Constitution of the United States. Webster, taking a traditional nation-
alistic tone, held that the Constitution recognized slaves as property, and as 
such they fell under the commerce clause. There was no ground, Webster 
insisted, for applying a different rule to property in slaves than to other 
6Martin Siegel, The Taney Courl: 1836-1864, vol. 3, The Supreme Courl in American 
Ufe, eel. George J. Lankevich (Millwood, NY: Associated Faculty Press, 1987), 265-66. 
7New Yorkv. Miln, 668-70. 
8Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 800. 
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property,9 citing the nationalism of Gibbons v. Ogden to support his con-
tention. Slaughter's defense thus came from quite different commerce 
clause interpretations and regional outlooks. 
The attorney for Groves, Robert J. Walker, presented an argument of 
such length that it could not be included in the Court's report. Walker 
explicitly acknowledged the exclusive nature of Congressional power over 
interstate commerce. He then turned this argument on its head by making 
it a potential threat to free states should the doctrine be applied to slavery. 
After dismissing the "enabling legislation" argument, Walker argued that 
the history of the [C]onstitution of the Union shows that the 
wont of uniformity, as regards regulation of commerce, was 
the greater motive leading to the formation of that instru-
ment .... The power to regulate commerce among the states 
is 'supreme and exclusive,' it is vested in [C]ongress alone; 
and if under it, [C]ongress may forbid or authorize the 
transportation of slaves from state to state, in defiance of state 
authority, then indeed, we shall have reached a crisis in the 
abolition controversy, most alarming and most momentous.10 
While stating the case for constitutional nationalism and commercial 
uniformity, Walker showed that slavery could not, in fact, fall under the 
authority of this regulating power. He continued: 
But Massachusetts, it is said, may exempt herself from the 
operation of this power of [C]ongress, by declaring slaves not 
to be property within her limits; and if so, may not Mississippi 
exempt herself in a similar manner, by declaring, as she has 
done, that the slaves of other states shall not be merchandise 
within her limits. 11 
9Charles Grove Haines and Foster H. Sherwood, The Role of the Supreme Court in 
American Government and Politics, 1835-1864 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1957), 112. 
10Robert J. Walker, "Argument of Robert J. Walker Before the Supreme Court of the 
United States on the Mississippi Slave Quesion," in Southern Slaves in Free State 
Courts: The Pamphlet Literature, series 1, vol. 2 of Slavery, Race and the American 
Legal System, 1700-1872, ed. Paul Finkelman (New York: Garland, 198~). 123. 
11 1bid., 123-24. 
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Further, he questioned, "if (C]ongress possess [sic] the power to increase 
slavery in a state, why not also the power to decrease it?"12 
Referring to Article I, Section 9, sixth clause of the Constitution ("No 
preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce ... to the ports of 
one state over those of another"), Walker argued that a Mississippi law 
restricting slavery must have equal force to a Massachusetts law prohibiting 
the introduction of slaves, or "preference" is given to Massachusetts.13 
Implicit in this argument was the "two-edged sword": if Mississippi could not 
prohibit the introduction of slaves as merchandise, then, based on 
commercial uniformity and congressional exclusivity, neither could 
Massachusetts prohibit the introduction of slaves as merchandise. The only 
way around this potential conflict, according to Walker, was to conclude that 
slavery was outside the realm of interstate commerce. 
As to why slavery was outside the reach of congressional regulation 
(already accepted in the argument as an exclusive power), Walker reasoned 
that the Constitution referred to slaves as "persons held to service." As 
such, slaves were not merchandise to be regulated, and "how far they shall 
be so bound [was] exclusively a question of state authority."14 · 
In looking to the Federalist Papers for an interpretation of the 
constitutional status of slaves, as persons or as property, we find nothing 
definitive. Indeed, in "Federalist No. 54," James Madison wrote that 
the true state of the case is that they partake of both these 
qualities; being considered by our laws, in some respects, as 
persons, and in other respects, as property ... The Federal 
Constitution therefore, decides with great propriety on the ·case 
of our slaves, when it views them in the mixt character of 
persons and of property. This is in fact their true character.15 
Madison therefore denied Walker's contention that slaves were viewed 
as persons by the Constitution and as property by the states. Madison 
showed that the Constitution's ambivalent view of the nature of slaves 
121bid., 125. 
131bid., 127. 
141bid .• 130. 
15James Madison,"Federalist No. 54," in The Federalist Papers (1788; reprint, New 
York: Bantam, 1982), 276. 
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{embodied in Article I, Section 2, the "three-fifths" clause) was only an 
appropriate acknowledgment of the ambivalence of state laws. Madison's 
vaguely defined "mixt character'' offered much leeway in defining a slave's 
status in specific situations. 
Walker continued his argument by excluding persons from the reach of 
commercial regulation and taking an ironic shot at the abolitionists. He 
asserted that "it is the abolitionists who must wholly deprive the slaves of the 
character of persons, and reduce them in all respects to the level of 
merchandise, before they can apply to them the power of [C]ongress to 
regulate commerce among the states." Walker concluded his lengthy 
argument with another shot at the abolitionists: "when ... all shall now be 
informed, that over the subject of slavery, [C]ongress possess [sic] no 
jurisdiction; the power of agitators will expire."16 
The decision of the Court in Groves sidestepped the commerce clause 
question altogether by deciding, in an opinion written by Justice Thompson, 
that the Mississippi constitutional amendment prohibiting the introduction of 
slaves as merchandise required enabling legislation in order to have force. 
Slaughter was to be paid his due. Thus the overarching question raised by 
the case was reduced to a more specific and manageable subject. The 
justices were, however, unwilling to let the question of commercial regulation 
go unaddressed. 
Abolitionist and perennial presidential aspirant Justice John McClean 
held forth on the commerce question even though, as he admitted, it is "not 
necessary to a decision of the case ... yet, it is so intimately connected with 
it ... I deem it fit and proper to express my opinion on it." McClean offered 
straightforward economic nationalism and held that "unless the power [over 
interstate commerce] be not only paramount, but exclusive, the Constitution 
must fail to attain one of the principal objects "of its formation." Then, echo-
ing Walker's argument, McClean asserted that if "a State may admit or 
prohibit slaves at its discretion, this power must be in the state and not in the 
Congress ... By the laws of certain States, slaves are treated as property 
... [however] the Constitution treats them as persons."17 
Thus we see the arguments of Robert Walker defending a slave state's 
constitution and paving the way for a defense of slavery against federal 
interference confirmed by an abolitionist justice's obiter dicta, in 
an apparent attempt to lay the groundwork to protect free states from slave 
1SWalker, "Argument of Robert J. Walker," 130, 162. 
17 Groves v. Slaughter, 821. 
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incursions.18 Both Walker and McClean recognized the implications of 
national commercial uniformity as it applied to slavery. 
The ob#er dicta continued with Chief Justice Taney writing that "in my 
judgment the power over this subject [slavery] is exdusively with the several 
States." Taney did not offer a justification for this opinion. He instead 
revealed his political motivations for offering it: "I do not, however, mean to 
argue this question; and I state my opinion upon it, on account of the interest 
which a large portion of the union naturally feel in this matter ... and from 
an apprehension that my silence ... might be misconstrued."19 
A third justice weighed in with a concurring opinion, "reluctant," but again 
feeling compelled to comment on the technically irrelevant commerce clause 
question. Justice Henry Baldwin, at once both a states' rights advocate and 
national tariff supporter, began with a bold statement of economic 
nationalism. He asserted that "the power of Congress to regulate 
commerce ... is exclusive," but followed this with the statements that "I feel 
bound to consider slaves property," and "the Constitution recognizes and 
protects it [the right of property in slaves] from violation." The opinion of 
Justice Baldwin seems to be a prefiguring of the "substantive due process" 
of Dred Scott v. Sanford {1857).20 Baldwin used national exclusivity and 
commercial uniformity as an argument for the constitutional protection of 
property in slaves. 
Groves commands attention as the single case taken up by the Court 
during this period that directly involved both slavery and interstate com-
merce. In this case an abolitionist justice defended state power over 
slavery, a states' rights justice defended national exclusivity, and the Chief 
Justice made an unsupported, bald statement daiming exclusive state auth-
ority over slavery for fear of the potential political ramifications of his silence 
on the issue, all in a case where the majority opinion avoided the commerce 
clause/slavery question altogether. Divisions in the Court and the political 
dangers of a philosophy of economic nationalism-a philosophy that could 
cut both ways on the questions of slavery--that were revealed in Groves 
18Finkelman, Slavery in the Courtroom, 35; an obiter dicta is an opinion offered, 
frequently for political reasons, which has no direct bearing on the substance of a case. 
19Groves v. Slaughter, 822. 
201bid., 824. "Substantive due process," as opposed to "procedural due process," is 
the doctrine that holds certain matters, particularly those concerning use of private 
property, to be outside the competence of legislative regulation regardless of the 
propriety of the procedures used to enact the legislation. 
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surfaced again in later commerce clause cases that did not relate directly 
to slavery. 
The next major challenge involving interstate commerce to come before 
the Court was actually a combination of three cases (Thurlow v. Massa-
chusetts, Fletcherv. Rhode Island, and Peirce v. New Hampshire), known 
collectively as The License Cases (1847). All three involved state attempts 
to license retailers of alcoholic beverages and the question of whether this 
involved state protection of public welfare or an interference with interstate 
commerce. The New Hampshire law was particularly questionable, in that 
it affected sellers of bulk liquor and violated John Marshall's "original 
package" rule in Brown. Cases involving licensing of liquor sales would 
seem an unlikely place to find arguments over slavery. But in an 
atmosphere where the critical question was whether, and to what extent, 
congressional power over commerce embraced persons,21 the slavery 
question found its way into any case involving national authority over 
commerce. 
As these cases involved the issues of state police powers and reform 
legislation versus national commerce power, lawyers for the plaintiff in 
Fletcherv. Rhode Island referred to the relevant opinion in New York v. Mi/n. 
Ames and Whipple, attorneys for Joel Fletcher, argued that the licenses, as 
police power, were unconstitutional. Referring to Justice Barbour's extreme 
states' rights opinion in New York v. Miln, the attorneys asserted that "a 
supremacy over the Constitution ... was claimed for every, even the most 
petty, police law of a state or even a town or city." At this point, Justice 
James Moore Wayne declared that "he had no recollection that such 
language was in the opinion of the [C]ourt in that case at the time it received 
his concurrence." Indeed, it appeared that Justice Barbour added the more 
extreme states' rights language to the majority opinion after it was received 
by the other justices. Justice Wayne, a southern slave holder and Jackson 
appointee, was nonetheless (as an associate of John Marshall) "the most 
high-toned Federalist on the Bench."22 Wayne opposed Barbour's New York 
v. Miln opinion as it stood and raised the issue of Barbour's subterfuge again 
in The Passenger Cases (1849}. 
Ames and Whipple continued their attack on the Barbour opinion in 
language that revealed the underlying current of hostility over the slavery 
issue: 
21Newmyer, Marshall and Taney, 123. 
22Fietcher v. the State of Rhode Island, 5 Howard, 274; Siegel, The Taney Court, 
261. 
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[l]f any persons really held the doctrine in question upon the 
supposition that it was necessary for some of the States, 
which, though guaranteed by the Constitution, were at war 
with its whole spirit as well as with the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence, which the Constitution carried 
out as far as it could consistently with the existing condition of 
the country, they were guilty of a 'blunder.'23 
The attorneys here attributed the state police power doctrine of the 
Taney Court to a proslavery avoidance of the commerce power in order to 
protect the peculiar institution. Chief Justice Taney stepped back from the 
heated attack by Ames, Whipple, and Justice Wayne on the Barbour 
opinion, saying only that "no opinion was expressed upon it [the commerce 
clause] by the Court because the case [New York v. Miln] did not 
necessarily involve it."24 The opinion of the Court in The License Cases 
upheld the state license laws as a proper exercise of police powers. The 
Court, however, remained divided on the scope of the commerce power, 
and its position on police powers drew fire as a proslavery ruse. 
In the cases known collectively as The Passenger Cases (Norris v. the 
City of Boston and Smith v. Turner, 1849), the controversy over the scope 
of the commerce power reached an apparent climax. The individual cases 
involved Massachusetts and New York laws taxing immigrants arriving at 
their ports, but the questions of authority over slavery and the movement of 
free blacks and fugitive slaves were addressed in a larger sense. 
Southerners were concerned over the fate of these laws, as they were 
analogous to southern laws for inspecting vessels and checking the 
immigration of free blacks.25 These laws involved the taxing of ships' 
masters for the support of the ships' indigent and sick, making the case 
similar to New York v. Mi/n. Antislavery forces supported state police power 
as a weapon against fugitive slave laws. Southern states opposed the 
northern use of a police powers doctrine against slavery but supported 
police powers to uphold their own laws against the immigration of free 
blacks into slave states. 
Attorney John Davis appeared for the city of Boston in the first of The 
Passenger Cases. He argued that the law did not serve to regulate 
23Fietcher v. the State of Rhode Island, 27 4. 
24Jbid., 277. 
26Newmyer, Marshall and Taney, 104. 
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commerce, as "goods are the subject of commerce; persons are not, nor do 
they belong to commerce." Furthermore, he denied that the Massachusetts 
law conflicted with any federal legislation. Davis then introduced the subject 
of state laws prohibiting the importation of slaves: "Nearly all slave states 
have laws upon this subject, forbidding the introduction of slaves as 
merchandise under penalties. The free states go farther, and so do some 
of the slave states, and emancipate the slaves thus brought in, in violation 
of law."26 Davis asserted that if states could regulate and prohibit the intro-
duction of slaves, then surely states had the authority to regulate the 
immigration of the diseased, the indigent, and the insane. By using this 
analogy, he introduced the northern states' rights position regarding fugitive 
slaves and tied it to southern laws prohibiting the importation of slaves as 
merchandise. 
Arguing for the plaintiff, Prescott Hall contended that a state had the right 
to police but not to tax foreign or interstate commerce. Even more pertinent 
for the issues of slavery and the commerce clause was Daniel Webster's 
argument for the unconstitutionality of the Massachusetts law. It was not 
published in the Court Reports since the trial grew too lengthy, with court 
reporter Howard noting that "it is impossible to report all these arguments. 
If it were done these cases alone would require a volume." Indeed, just the 
reported arguments, when combined with the five concurring and four 
dissenting opinions, took roughly one hundred and twenty pages of the 
Supreme Court Reports. But the substance of Webster's argument was 
published in the Baltimore American: "Mr. Webster spoke powerfully of the 
sanctity of the decisions of the Supreme Court, in reply to a remark of the 
opposite council [sic] that the people were beginning to forget the life tenure 
of the Judges, in consequence of the infusion of popular sentiment into the 
decisions of the courts." Webster was apparently commenting Qn a popular 
perception (one that may have been accurate if Chief Justice Taney's 
comments in Groves are any indication) that the Court had become 
politicized. Thus he deemed it necessary to defend the dignity of the 
Supreme Court: 
Authorities were quoted to show that commerce extended to 
persons as well as to things .... Mr. Webster incidentally 
alluded to the question of domestic slavery, which had been 
made prominent by counsel upon the other side. It was, he 
26Norris v. the City of Boston, 7 Howard, 720. 
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said, a peculiar institution, the existence of which was 
recognized by the Constitution . . . There it was placed by 
those who framed its existence, and he did not wish to disturb 
it, nor should he lift his finger to do so. It belonged not to him, 
but to those alone who had power over it. 27 
Webster, having made a strong stand for commercial nationalism that 
extended to persons as well as goods, then exempted domestic slavery 
from this system and declared it a "peculiar institution" purely under state 
authority. This argument presaged Webster's refusal, as expressed in a 
later speech of March, 1850, to acknowledge the legitimacy of, or participate 
in, the perceived sectional crisis. It contradicted, however, his argument 
eight years earlier In Groves that there were no grounds for separating 
slaves from other persons under the Constitution. This shift reflected the 
heightened tensions and the need for compromise in the years leading up 
to the Compromise of 1850. 
The decision of the Court in Norris, written by Justice McClean, was 
powerfully nationalistic: "A concurrent power in the States to regulate 
commerce is an anomaly not found in the Constitution." McClean, in an 
apparent response to Davis's contention that the Massachusetts law did not 
conflict with any federal law, gave an interesting interpretation of Marshall's 
Wilson v. Black Bird Cmek Marsh Co. decision of 1829, asserting that while 
the absence of relevant federal regulation was necessary for a ~tate law to 
be constitutional, it did not guarantee constitutionality; a state law might still 
violate the Constitution in such circumstances.28 
Justice Wayne, in a concurring opinion, again took the opportunity to 
blast Justice Barbour's police power decision in New York and to claim, as 
he did in The Ucense Cases, that the more radical states' rights language 
of the opinion had been added after his concurrence. Justice McKinley, 
whose views were those of popular southern orthodoxy,29 also concurred 
with the nationalist opinion, but insisted that slaves were excluded from the 
commerce power. 
In dissent, Chief Justice Taney felt it necessary to comment on what he 
thought to be the logical result of extending exclusive national authority over 
27 Baltimore American quoted in Haines and Sherwood, Supreme Court, 154-56. 
28The Passenger Cases, 7 Howard, 749-50. 
29Siegel, The Taney Court, 272. 
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immigration of persons. He asserted that "if the States have granted this 
great power in one case [immigration], they have granted it in the other; and 
every state may be compelled to receive a cargo of slaves from Africa, 
whatever danger it may bring upon the State and however earnestly it may 
desire to prevent it." This was obviously hyperbole, as the foreign slave 
trade had been banned by act of Congress in 1808 as authorized by the 
Constitution. It appears that Taney made this comment for political 
intention--that of the extension of slavery in the territories. Justice Peter 
Daniel, known for his eccentric and anachronistic dissents and predictable 
proslavery, sectional opinions,30 concurred with Taney's dissent. 
Although a New Englander, Justice Levi Woodbury demonstrated a 
dedication to strict construction of the Constitution and state sovereignty that 
made southerners feel they had a friend on the high court.31 Indeed, it was 
Justice Woodbury who offered the most inflammatory and threatening 
comments in his concurrence with Taney's dissent. As in Justice Baldwin's 
comments in Groves, we again find a prefiguring of the Dred Scott 
substantive due process opinion. Justice Woodbury, commenting on the 
consequences of national authority over the movement of passengers, 
boldly held that national exclusivity and commercial uniformity cut both ways 
in regard to slavery: 
If Congress, with or without a coordinate or concurrent power 
in the state, can prohibit other persons as well as slaves from 
coming into states, they can of course allow it, and hence can 
permit and demand the admission of slaves as well as any 
kind of free persons ... and enforce the demand ... however 
obnoxious to the habits and wishes of the people of a 
particular stateY · 
It is difficult to say whether Justice Woodbury was attempting to defend 
New England's states' rights antislavery position or southern rights to 
protect property in slaves, or to maintain the status quo by protecting both 
positions. In any event, the mutual danger to both positions of a strong, 
consistent, commercial nationalism took on the quality of mutually assured 
30 The Passenger Cases, 782; Siegel, The Taney Court, 275. 
31 Siegel, The Taney Court, 281. 
32 The Passenger Cases, 811. 
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destruction and continued to render the Court incapable of offering a clear 
application of congressional commerce powers. 
When Justice Woodbury died in 1851, President Fillmore appointed 
Massachusetts Whig Benjamin Curtis to the Court. The next year, Curtis 
wrote a consensus-building opinion in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the 
Port of Philadelphia, et a/. In what became known as the "Cooley rule," 
Justice Curtis presented the view that exclusivity "must be intended to refer 
to the subjects of that power and to say they are such a nature as to require 
exclusive legislation by Congress." He further contended that "either to 
affirm, or deny, that the nature of this power requires exclusive legislation 
by Congress is to lose sight of the nature of the subjects of this power, and 
to assert concerning all of them, what is really applicable but to a part."33 
To this Justice McClean dissented, upholding national exclusivity. 
Justice Daniel concurred but, true to form, wrote that state power was 
"original and inherent" and not merely to be "tolerated or held to the sanction 
of the federal government."34 With only one dissent and one concurring 
opinion, the flexible pragmatism of Justice Curtis brought about a distinct 
improvement over the fractured, argumentive atmosphere of The Passenger 
Cases. The Court now had a non-doctrinaire "doctrine" to apply to the 
commerce clause. Although the Cooley rule could not define what was to 
be subject to national authority and what was to be subject to state authority, 
it did allow for the flexibility needed in the heated atmosphere of the times. 
The rule changed the focus from the nature of the commerce power to the 
nature of the subjects of the commerce power and thus diffused the conflict 
over congressional exclusivity for a time. 
Cooley v. Board of Wardens ends this survey of the Taney Court's 
tempestuous battle over the commerce clause. Between 1837 and 1852, 
conflicting interests and opinions regarding slavery and the status of slaves 
under the Constitution are found in the arguments of lawyers and in the 
opinions of justices, often In cases that touched upon slavery only in the 
most tangential way. The hostile and politicized exchanges found in the 
Court Reports of the cases involving the commerce clause appear to 
support the interpretation that there was not a single important case 
after 1819 in which the deployment of power in the federal system was at 
issue where slavery did not silently influence the deliberation of the 
33Cooleyv. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia et al, 12 Howard, 1005. 
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justices.35 It should be added, based on the material in the Taney Court 
commerce cases, that the influence of slavery was often more than silent. 
Obviously there were issues other than slavery that complicated the 
Court's treatment of interstate commerce. The need to protect focal 
interests from national business interests in a growing economy was an 
important factor. But the sources clearly show that the constitutionally 
vague definition of the status of slaves, the conflict between national 
uniformity and focal interests, and the uncertainty over whether "commerce" 
extended to persons contributed to the political problems faced by the Court. 
As the slavery question percolated upward from focal to national politics 
and finally to the national judiciary, it became an increasingly difficult subject 
to manage. As the introduction of the slavery issue into all cases involving 
national authority over commerce indicates, the Constitution, because of the 
vague nature of the compromise over "persons held to service," was in fact 
unable to manage the slavery question, and the Court itself became 
increasingly politicized. 
Much of the rhetoric about how commercial uniformity might alternately 
destroy or extend slavery was probably just that--rhetoric, for political 
purposes. The conflicting constitutional interpretations of the nature of 
slavery and the resulting pofiticization of the Court, however, represented 
the very real dilemma that slavery presented to a nation which saw 
commercial uniformity as, in some sense, essential to nationhood. The 
commerce clause, the "effective instrumenf' of national uniformity, was only 
effective to the extent that national uniformity could realistically exist. On the 
question of slavery, national uniformity could be seen as a "two-edged 
sword"; after Dred Scott, that sword divided the Union. 
35Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story, 367. 
